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ABSTRACT
The practice of human organ transplantation studies is 
shot through with questions concerning the concepts 
of selfhood and identity that continually reach out 
towards transmigration, displacement and haunting. 
In particular, heart transplantation is the site at which 
the parameters of human life and death are tested to 
their limits, not simply for the recipient but for the donor 
too. In conventional biomedicine, the definition and 
therefore the moment of death is a matter of ongoing 
and disturbing dispute between two major channels 
of thought. Should we understand life to end at the 
point of cessation of cardiac function, or alternatively 
that of the brainstem? That whole logic is predicated, 
however, on the familiar binary of life/death that fails to 
address urgent concerns in three arenas: social- cultural 
imaginaries, postmodernist philosophy and increasingly 
exploratory bioscience. If there is always something 
about death that is uncanny, that exceeds rationalist 
thought, then we need to queer the concept and ask 
whether there are more sensitive ways of thinking 
the process of dying. The very concept of extended 
life for the recipient is no simple outcome, and the 
question of whose life has been prolonged is far from 
clear. My contribution touches on the idea of thinking 
transplantation in the mode of parasitism but will 
suggest an alternative Deleuzian way forward.
The field of human organ transplantation studies 
is shot through with questions concerning the 
concepts of selfhood and identity that continually 
reach out towards transmigration, displacement 
and haunting. Most particularly, heart transplanta-
tion is the site at which the parameters of human 
life and death are tested to their limits, not simply 
for the recipient but for the donor too. In conven-
tional biomedicine, the definition and therefore 
the moment of death is a matter of ongoing and 
disturbing dispute between two major channels of 
thought. Should we understand life to end at the 
cessation of cardiac function, or alternatively that 
of the brainstem? The distinction is no trivial matter 
but is strongly tied to which utilitarian conse-
quences are in play, and how interventions like the 
removal of organs for transplant should be opera-
tionalised. The whole issue is predicated, however, 
on the familiar Western binary of life/death that 
fails to address urgent concerns in three arenas: 
social- cultural imaginaries, postmodernist philos-
ophy, and exploratory bioscience in which micro-
chimerism defies a simple temporal cut. If there 
is always something about death that is uncanny, 
that exceeds rationalist thought, then we need to 
queer the concept and ask whether there are more 
sensitive ways of thinking the process of deceased 
donation. The very concept of extended life for the 
recipient is no simple outcome, and the question of 
whose life has been prolonged is far from clear. My 
approach touches on the idea of thinking transplan-
tation in the mode of parasitism but will suggest an 
alternative Deleuzian way forward.
In the era of biopolitical thought and its concern 
with what constitutes the parameters of life, the 
emphasis has been firmly on the management of 
the living in every register of existence—social, 
political, ontological—without fully engaging with 
what, if anything, constitutes death as an irrecov-
erable endpoint. We understand that the dead still 
contribute as data as Puar (2010) points out, as 
environmental enrichment (The Corpse Project.), as 
the source of biological material through things like 
transplantation technologies (Sharp's 2006), or as 
the absent presence of memory, and so on, but what 
is rarely questioned is the putative break between 
the living and the dead. For all Western culture’s 
interest in zombies, ghosts, vampires and spectres, 
the intrigue of those uncanny modes arises from 
the supposition that they are quasi- animate forms 
that should not be living. Certainly life and death 
intrude on one another, but the prevailing psycho-
social imaginary of the global North remains confi-
dent that the entanglement can be resolved into 
a familiar binary difference. What would it mean 
then to think not about death as a bounded cate-
gory but as irreducibly entangled in the processes 
of life? Jacques Derrida is perhaps exemplary in 
his exhortation to live well with the dead and to 
accept the hauntological dimensions of all exist-
ence—by which he refers to those elements which 
are neither present nor absent, neither dead nor 
alive—while Gilles Deleuze provides a way of chal-
lenging the normative temporalities of death. I want 
to start, however, by looking at the implications of 
some more mundane considerations arising from 
the biomedical understanding of death and dying, 
particularly in relation to heart transplantation, and 
by reflecting on some empirical data as they illumi-
nate my theorisation of the issues involved.
Over several years, I have collaborated on two 
major qualitative research projects in Canada: 
the Process of Incorporating a Transplanted Heart 
(PITH) initiated in 2007, which from 2011 segued 
into The gift of life: A critical visual exploration 
of donor families’ responses to organ donation 
(GOLA).1 Both projects entailed extended inter-
views with 25 and 22 respondents, respectively, 
all of which were both audio and video recorded. 
Regardless of the switch in focus from recipients to 
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donor proxies, the question of death has been of crucial impor-
tance throughout, although in very different registers. For recip-
ients faced otherwise with imminent demise, the death of the 
donor is a necessary facet of their own survival, and it produces, 
not surprisingly, a complex mix of relief, gratitude, obligation 
and guilt. Initially, many who have received a graft claim not 
to think about the provenance of the organ, but in interview 
the overwhelming majority express significant disturbance about 
their relation to the donor in which the other seems to persist 
within the self. It might be called a relationship of spectrality. 
The account of living on as a direct result of deceased donation 
brings life and death into an unwelcome focus that undermines 
the public interest in a heroic narrative in which both sides of 
the transaction can be lauded for their courage. When it comes 
to donor proxies (most often family members), the relation to 
life and death is even more complex, with their task of agreeing 
to the donation of specific organs falling into a tight window 
while their close relation is apparently still living. If death has 
already been declared it is generally too late to evacuate working 
organs, so biomedical staff are obliged to solicit consent to dona-
tion while at the same time exemplifying continuing care for 
the dying person. Once a medical determination has been made 
of brain death, life support is maintained, enabling the heart to 
continue beating until it has been removed and transported on 
ice to the site of implantation into another who is equally marked 
as dying. The process can be highly emotionally disturbing, but 
most biomedical professionals typically display no doubts about 
the moment at which ‘natural’ death has occurred and it would 
appear appropriate to terminate any life support technology. 
Donor families are far less certain and may feel acute distress, 
not only in being asked to rapidly consent during a time of 
shock and often disbelief, but also in frequently questioning if 
the person before them is really dead.
In all but certain unusual cases, the normative split between 
dead and alive prevails, and where donor families do refuse 
consent it is often for reasons other than a questioning of death 
itself. Yet there are some disturbing and highly visible anom-
alies that trouble the distinction. For example, even after the 
machinery that prolongs respiration and heart beat has been 
disconnected, a putatively brain dead body may show strong 
signs of animation, as in the so- called Lazarus sign (Taskin 
2017). This often involves raising the arms over the head and 
then lowering them onto the chest, the biomedical explanation 
being that it is a spinal reflex arc that happens independently of 
the brain and has nothing to do with personhood. At this point, 
we might pause to wonder at the justification of excluding such 
phenomena which though rare in ‘death’ are an intrinsic part of 
everyday living. Indeed without such reflexes we would suffer 
all sorts of unnecessary trauma to our embodied selves, but by 
and large heart transplant teams are not phenomenologists but 
utilitarians. The connection between biological brain matter and 
personhood in the philosophy of consciousness is already conten-
tious, but the overwhelming emphasis in the biomedical arena 
on the solid brain as the marker of proper life is a little puzzling. 
Neuroscientific research has revealed that the heart itself and 
its immediate surrounds are an area extremely rich in neuron 
activity that directly modulates the relation between emotion 
and cardiac function, and while the claim that the intracardiac 
nervous system constitutes a little ‘brain’ is deeply misleading, 
there is a clear indication that the heart is not simply controlled 
by the brain.2 In some invertebrates and particularly cephalo-
pods, such as the octopus, there is effectively no central brain 
at all, but simply a dispersed network of neurons throughout 
the body. Yet the movement of an octopus cannot be reduced to 
non- intentional reflex insofar as the animal is thought to have 
the intelligence of a young human child, with a well- documented 
capacity for inductive learning and memory (Godfrey- Smith 
2016). Evolutionary paths may be very different, but must we 
suppose that human reflex has no connection to such higher 
functions?
Even in the face of growing research, the implications of such 
considerations remain speculative, but my misgivings become 
clearer in the recent historical context of what constitutes death 
for a prospective heart donor. Up until the 1960s death was 
defined as the failure of the cardiorespiratory system, with the 
permanent cessation of breathing being the unquestioned mark 
of death. With the invention of the artificial ventilator, however, 
a dying patient could be resuscitated or stabilised so that the 
heart would go on beating for an indefinite period. Given that 
the 1960s were also the point at which organ transplantation 
became feasible, this technological intervention clearly created a 
conundrum in that it could no longer be certain that the patient 
had died. Partly in response to this, the biomedical definition of 
death—in Westernised societies at least—was shifted in 1967 to 
brain death which it was felt could be accurately assessed even 
though the body was warm, breathing and oxygenated.3 In other 
words, death was now synonymous to lack of brain function—
which was taken to integrate the whole body—though there was 
never a clear explanation as to why the cessation of one organ 
should become the sole marker. As Peter Singer—an arch util-
itarian who approved the choice—puts it, the new definition 
of death was ‘an ethical choice masquerading as a medical fact’ 
(Singer 1995, 50). What made it ethical for Singer was precisely 
the utilitarian calculus of weighing the prospect of other lives 
saved against the possible harm done to the donor. In short, 
the adoption of the brain dead criterion was always a fudge. In 
2008 the US Presidents Commission revisited and amended the 
definition to claim that the destruction of the brain constituted 
death because it meant that the person could no longer engage in 
‘commerce with the surrounding world’. What that phrase actu-
ally means is far from self- evident, and many families who go 
on supporting those on life support machines for months, even 
years, would claim that there are forms of rudimentary commu-
nication. A review by Shah, Kasper, and Miller (2015) of 43 
geographically diverse research papers demonstrated that fami-
lies, cross- culturally, ‘possess hope for a miracle or the belief that 
their family member may recover after brain death’ (293).4 The 
public discourse of biomedicine is not known for its embrace of 
indeterminacy, however, and such families are habitually charac-
terised as deluded (Shah, Kasper, and Miller 2015). At root there 
may be a serious mismatch between the timelines of biomedical 
practices such as transplant surgery, which is strictly linear and 
teleological, and the lingering phenomenological temporality of 
life and death.5
That disparity underpins the immediate scenario of donation 
and retrieval of the organ where the codification of passing time 
is at its most acute and conflicted, as our qualitative study of 22 
Canadian donor families shows. All consented to the donation 
of one or, more usually, several organs once brain dead had been 
established, yet the clinicians’ desire for a speedy procedure gave 
little time for bereaved relations to examine their own feelings 
and doubts. While none of our interviewees overtly questioned 
the distinction between cardiac and brain death, the sight of a 
still breathing, at least minimally reactive body was extremely 
disturbing for many. As Kathleen Fenton puts it, ‘society as a 
whole is not completely comfortable with the idea that a warm, 
pink patient is actually a corpse’ (Clarke, Fenton, and Sade 2016, 
2056). At an everyday level, the concept of brain death is difficult 
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to grasp—“I think he died in front of me,” said one mother, 
only to be told that her son had already been dead for several 
hours—and it may not be until the respirator is switched off that 
there is any final acceptance. What the lay donor families are 
unlikely to know is that new techniques—called heart beating 
transfer—now obviate the need to stop the heart at all. Once the 
heart can be removed from the ventilated donor, it is placed in a 
machine that perfuses it during transportation to the recipient’s 
location. In consequence the graft continues beating throughout, 
and in such cases cardiac death as such never occurs. For the 
clinical staff the ‘now’ of the life/death binary is what makes the 
whole procedure ethically acceptable, and it is possible that the 
new technique will disrupt that certainty once it becomes more 
widely used. For families, however, the anguish of uncertainty is 
already all too apparent.
All the donor proxies interviewed for the GOLA project—
which was an art, social sciences, humanities and medical 
sciences collaboration—had agreed to donation whatever their 
misgivings. For just a few, it was a seamless transaction that 
scarcely raised any ontological anxieties and provoked only 
minimal speculation on the meaning and temporality of death. 
One robust 80- year- old retired professor (D20) who donated 
her husband’s organs told the interviewers, “I looked down at 
him and said that’s not my husband…the body is just cells…
they’re not the person,” while the parents (D6) of a deceased 
daughter remarked, “We were a little bit on pins and needles 
to make sure it [donation] happened.” Most commonly, clinical 
staff were praised for their sensitive approach, but they could 
not, nevertheless, cover over the strangeness of the situation. 
As one mother (D18) puts it, they “were very professional and 
personal at the same time,” but “in the back of my mind I kept 
wondering was he really gone.” The majority of respondents, 
however, experienced the short process of gaining consent as 
highly disturbing—“like a pushy used car salesman,” said two 
bereaved sisters (D3) who had witnessed their “dead” brother’s 
legs still twitching and a tear falling from his face; or “like seagulls 
circling” as one bereaved husband (D1) described the clinical 
staff. A mother (D8) who still felt traumatised 36 months later 
told us that the time of her daughter dying was unbelievably bad 
because “she looked like she was just asleep,” so “I just wanted 
to punch them in the face…That’s your child being carved up to 
be doled out to other people.” Another mother (D16), this time 
of an adult son described 3 days of emotional turmoil when “you 
listen but you don’t hear…it’s gut wrenching.” Her profound 
doubts following consent pervaded her dreams: “I was having 
nightmares…when they were removing his heart and eyes, he 
was screaming.” Another (D2) said of the same period: “I felt 
some- one was surgically removing my heart.”
The provision of life support that is necessary during the 
quasi- death period to maintain the functionality of organs 
clearly creates an epistemological quagmire for those who are 
asked for consent, which does not end once the transplantations 
have been completed. This can be illustrated with reference to a 
particular case of a young First Nations man who had drowned 
but been temporarily revived. This was an especially lengthy and 
harrowing story in that the estranged non- indigenous mother 
(D14) was interviewed separately from her indigenous husband 
and daughter (D9). Everyone was in agreement that the deceased 
man, Eric,6 was highly spiritual, believed in saving others and 
would have wanted to donate his organs. The mother had 
pressed for donation right away and saw it as a gift received by 
recipients—“to be able to live on – that’s a huge gift”—rather 
than as a gift given by her son which would somehow enable him 
to live on through them. The father, however, had wanted to be 
sure and resisted consent, leading to an 8- day gap between the 
declaration of brain death and donation.
During that period he attended a drumming ceremony at the 
lake where Eric drowned, and felt that he was given certain 
signs from the natural world that convinced him that donation 
should go ahead: two loons on the lake that spoke to the calm-
ness of Eric’s spirit, a crow that flew up overhead in response 
to a prayer for a sign from Mother Earth, and finally coming 
across a seemingly dead, but still sprouting tree which signalled 
the intertwining of life and death. For the father, living on did 
devolve on his son but in two conflicting ways. On the one hand 
his First Nations beliefs were opposed to donation because the 
body is cherished (as a gift in itself), the self is transcendent, and 
not least because Eric’s eyes were needed to show him the way 
to the spirit world. On the other hand he firmly believed that 
both Eric and the recipients would be enabled to live on through 
donation. Each parent and his sister talked about Eric actively 
saving five lives through the distribution of his organs and some-
what unusually they saw his continued being- in- the- world as a 
matter of everything being connected and sustained. The father’s 
raw grief at his loss was mediated by a sense of Eric’s continuing 
presence in his life and he stressed how he would like to ask the 
heart recipient if he ever wanted to ride a horse or climb moun-
tains as his son did. For the family, Eric is both part of the recip-
ients and may guide their behaviour, but he is also everywhere, 
beyond any specific temporal location. As the mother said about 
the interview, “I love talking about Eric…I hope he hears me,” 
while the father and the sister are certain they are still in commu-
nication. A spirit guide from another indigenous group had even 
contacted them with a message from Eric which they are inclined 
to accept at face value.
The specific indigenous imaginary7 at work here is clearly 
somewhat different from the Canadian mainstream and should 
remind us of the limitations of settler colonial epistemology 
and ontology,8 although intriguingly it also seems to speak to 
the kind of interconnections that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
call assemblages, of which more later. In that mode, dying is 
both a personal event, experienced within a conventional time 
frame, but also a continuing atemporal process that exceeds the 
binary of life/death. This is far from the contemporary operation 
of conventional biopolitics in which the threshold of mortality 
marks the cessation of being. Traditionally the disturbance of 
death is the endpoint of the social contract and of any further 
engagement with others. Such a highly rationalist and mascu-
linist construction of the centrality of the living grounds, on the 
one hand, the biomedical impetus to preserve life at all costs 
and, on the other, a plethora of surveillance and control technol-
ogies that seek to establish and maintain the distinction between 
those deserving and undeserving of survival. I would contend 
that both branches are highly evident in the mode of organ dona-
tion, which above all is situated in the affluent technologised 
societies of the global North. The largely unseen apparatus of 
consigning and transporting viable organs is a highly complex 
logistical and biopolitical operation that in the end purports to 
rely solely on an apparently free choice—in most jurisdictions 
at least—to willingly donate body parts to unknown others. 
The whole emphasis of what are called OPOs (organ procure-
ment organisations) is directed towards promoting the supposed 
altruism of donors and covering over any unsavoury mentions 
of death or dying. With heart donation, the donor is, of course, 
always dead, but that would hardly be apparent from the litera-
ture which stresses only the altruism of realising the gift of life. 
For all the smooth publicity, however, there is always a shortfall 
in organs offered and organs needed to meet the demand for 
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heart transplantation to the extent that many countries, espe-
cially in Europe and including the UK, are turning to presumed 
consent where none has been given in advance. At the same time 
the illegal global trade in organs as a branch of neoliberal capi-
talism is thriving at the expense of those populations marked as 
undeserving. Throughout, disciplinary technologies mesh with 
the preservation of life and the denial of death.
What does all this mean to donor families reflecting on their 
decisions to assent to the transplantation process? The question 
of living on is central to their thinking, although the grief expe-
rienced may overwhelm other affects. The narrative favoured 
by OPOs clearly promotes the transplant organ as the so- called 
gift of life that offers the hope of survival to recipients, with 
the associated benefit to donor proxies that they have engaged 
in an altruistic act. There is recognition too that altruism is 
not entirely disinterested in that giving has therapeutic effects 
in introducing something positive into the scenario of loss. As 
one woman (D4) puts it, “I had to believe in something good. It 
was the most awful thing,” while an upbeat couple (D6) whose 
daughter died in a Road Traffic Accident stressed, “Do the recip-
ients know how happy we are?” “Do they know we are on their 
team?” What is less acknowledged is that many proxies are more 
or less invested in the belief that through donation it is not only 
the recipient but also their dead loved one who will live on. 
It is certainly the case that donor proxies may express a deep 
concern for recipients and say that they would be devastated 
again should the recipient fail to flourish, but as our interviews 
revealed it is rarely that simple. As the father (D8) of young 
woman killed in a light aircraft crash told us, “we don’t need any 
more grief,” while his wife adds, “Ruth [the recipient] is a little 
piece of Lisa [their daughter]…if something happened to her, it 
would be another death for Lisa.” The empirical data show that 
the majority of donor families go on referring to transplanted 
hearts as still belonging to their own loved one, and as having 
an agency independent of the recipient, who in turn habitually 
experiences the transplanted organ as not fully incorporated to 
the self, but rather as a living reminder of the deceased donor. 
Typically as one respondent (D13) puts it, “There’s my sister’s 
heart beating away in someone else, bringing them joy,” and she 
thinks of the donated organs as “keeping them alive, that’s what 
they’re doing, they’re keeping others alive with their organs.” It 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that living on refers both to 
the survival of the recipient and to the donor. In some magical 
sense the necessary death of the donor is negated and she is not 
so much reincarnated in an other as she occupies a new loca-
tion where aspects of the self can endure. As the mother (D2) 
of a teenage donor puts it, “I haven’t lost him – I know exactly 
where he is…he’s still giving,” or a daughter (D17) speaking of 
her father, “He lives on, he got to share himself with strangers.” 
There are perhaps some hints of parasitism in the strange alli-
ance between the deceased donor and the recipient, where one 
of the organisms benefits at the expense of another, but given 
the marked emphasis on altruism it may better be thought of as a 
hauntological relation or symbiotic entanglement.
The whole procedure is greatly complicated where anonymity 
between recipients and proxies is enforced, although that 
requirement is breached with some frequency. In many jurisdic-
tions—including in the geographical area of my own research—
anonymity is legally mandated between transplant recipients 
and organ donors or their proxies. Any communication between 
donor families and heart recipients is vetted, depersonalised 
and anonymised prior to being shared, such that no one should 
know the identity of the giver and the receiver of ‘gifted’ organs. 
Despite the widespread terminology of the ‘gift of life’ to describe 
the transplanted organ, which implies an intimacy in the relation 
between the donor and the recipient, anonymity has been central 
to biomedical, psychosocial and societal practices and discourses 
around the process. The result is an inevitable disjunct between 
significant evidence that both individual recipients and donor 
families may be emotionally troubled by the prohibition, and the 
wider biopolitical context of transplantation procedures which 
operate through a systemic de- individualisation of donors and 
serve to endorse the commodification of their bodies. The prac-
tice of anonymous donation is deemed a public good—mediated 
by the biomedical community—in which the gift is not personal 
at all, but becomes an expression of community cohesion rather 
than an enactment between individuals. The bitter irony, never-
theless, is that those most intimately concerned are simultane-
ously encouraged to celebrate the individual ‘gift’ relationship 
and denied knowledge of their counterparts as either recipients 
or donors. Either way, anonymity intends to effect a profound 
depersonalisation that enables organs to be translocated in the 
service of utilitarian ethics. Although OPOs are not unaware of 
the strength of negative feeling about imposed anonymity, they 
go to some lengths to cover over identities, ostensibly for the 
protection of both donor proxies and recipients. There may, of 
course, some sense to this,9 but in general it is a highly paternal-
istic approach that over- rides the potentially mutual choices of 
those involved.
Throughout the pretransplant and post- transplant process, 
the donor is disembodied and effectively stripped of identity, 
seen only as the source of spare body parts precisely because 
in conventional biomedicine the heart is regarded merely as a 
pump, and transplantation as a technically mediated medical 
intervention with no metaphysical or ontological connota-
tions.10 With regard to donor organs, the concept of commod-
ification finds its justification in the tradition of mechanistic 
representation of the body in Western culture, and the emphasis 
on depersonalisation in the relatively recent procedure of heart 
transplantation evokes the Weberian concept of rationalisation 
and its principles of calculability, predictability and control. It 
precludes any consideration of the disturbances to embodiment 
and personal identity that arise from disturbances to the bodily 
morphology of an individual patient. In any case, the status of 
deceased donors—any ‘dead’ body really—is problematic in that 
they are both enduringly material—the source of further of life—
and non- living, a spectral presence. The mechanistic model that 
informs the imposition of anonymity nevertheless over- rides the 
probable emotions of the organ donor proxies and recipients by 
sterilising the process through which they communicate. While 
such objectivity sometimes does serve a protective purpose in 
shielding both sides from unwanted expressions of intimacy, the 
bureaucratic operation of transplant support services dehuman-
ises the participants and removes emotion from the logistical and 
biomedical procedures of procuring and transporting organs, 
matching donors and recipients on the basis of biometrics, and 
providing post- transplantation support. It is at times a deeply 
inappropriate and unwelcome scenario, given the deliberative 
disregard of human interaction. The relentless objectification 
of what is an inherently subjective and intimate process can be 
deeply damaging. Over 80% of our recipient cohort, for example, 
were reduced to tears of distress or despair in describing their 
struggles to write the anonymous letter implicitly demanded by 
their receiving the gift of life (Poole et al. 2011), while on the 
donor side there was similar anguish if nothing was heard from 
the anonymous recipients.
Right from the start with the original PITH project and subse-
quently with the GOLA research, our own study has been guided 
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by a very different approach that initially referenced the philos-
ophy of Merleau- Ponty (1968), for whom the body is never 
merely an object, and self- identity not given but constructed 
through embodied, spatial and temporal connections with 
others. As a phenomenologist, Merleau- Ponty describes the 
world itself in corporeal terms and individuals as participants 
in a network of inherently intersubjective encounters. Specifi-
cally, he understands the ‘flesh of the world’ as a living web of 
interconnections in which we are all implicated (Cataldi 1993). 
Subjective experience is to the fore, but Merleau- Ponty implies 
that the individual cannot be treated as an autonomous entity, 
but is always in process, in a state of becoming that relies both 
on the interface between the body and the world, and on the 
interactions between embodied selves. In place of the rigid and 
normatively framed autonomous self for whom the body is a 
possession that gives rise to property rights and questions of 
alienability, this kind of self is inseparable from, and only exists 
in virtue of, those who are others. The approach focuses not 
simply on the abstract interconnections between self and other, 
but more fundamentally on an intercorporeality in which bodies 
are woven together. In contrast to the impersonality of the 
rationalist approach, phenomenology deals in the felt experience 
of emotions and affects. More specifically, the literal replacement 
of the hearts of terminally ill patients with donor organs under-
scores their delicate intercorporeality, drawing together givers 
and receivers in an intimate relationship. Beyond the hard- edged 
rationalism of the clinical narrative, such an understanding of 
the embodied self lends credence to reports of complex feelings 
of connection—even kinship—of heart transplant recipients 
with their donors. That such feelings can operate even under 
conditions of personal anonymity surely demonstrates their 
potency. Nonetheless, the pragmatic procedures of organ trans-
plantation rarely take the lived experiences of either recipients 
and donors (or their proxies) into account. Beyond the insistent 
gift of life rhetoric, the biomedical model of organ procurement, 
donation and transplantation encourages recipients to fragment 
the donor’s body and objectify organs as replaceable mechanical 
parts. Ideally the deceased donor’s once- personalised self would 
be disavowed.
What is really at stake in this seemingly uncaring approach 
opens up another dimension of anonymity in organ procurement 
and donation that I will touch on just briefly. While it is ethically 
routine to decry the international trade in scarce organs, the 
commodification of the body parts that it evokes is not confined 
to illicit activity. It is fundamental to the operation of transplan-
tation as both enhancing life and seeking death. The thanatopol-
itics of transplantation is not simply an aberrant side effect. Once 
the human body is thought of as an object of commodification 
in the Marxist sense, its specific fragmentation in the transplant 
scenario ultimately renders the organs of the deceased donor as 
objects, with a use- value, shaped by quality, quantity and utility, 
and determined through consumption. Evoking commodity 
fetishism, Sharp's (2006) compelling interpretation of the 
anonymous process of organ procurement and transplantation 
exposes its reliance on elaborate forms of metaphorical thinking, 
on the part of all those involved, that obscure the origins of 
displaced body parts. It is above all a process of mystification, 
as can be clearly seen in the contradictory biomedical discourse 
that strongly encourages the recipient to be grateful to the donor 
family for the gift of life while at the same time depersonalising 
the donor as merely the source of transferable spare parts. For 
biomedical professionals, the suspension of personhood at the 
moment of brain death marks the moment at which the body 
becomes ‘a reserve of commodities’ that will swiftly circulate 
in the transplant economy. Yet as Lindberg (2013) notes, ‘the 
imperceptible transformation of gratuitous organs into precious 
commodities is one of the big taboos of the transplantation medi-
cine’ (2013, 252). Such biopolitical concerns are seemingly far 
removed from the troubled register of personal exchanges, but in 
the end they interlock. Under the rubric of transplantation, the 
once identifiable human flesh of the donor vacates the space of 
the intimate and familial and becomes the object of public utility 
and technological expertise. The sense of an individual death is 
covered over, and those left behind are denied the physicality of 
an integral body to mourn, although communication between 
recipients and proxies may imaginatively seek to reconceive that 
lost personhood. Recipients, in particular, are strongly encour-
aged to write anonymised letters, with at least an expression of 
gratitude, although donor proxies—longing for some indication 
of the location of the gifted organ—may initiate the correspond-
ence. Given that any identifying text—gender, ethnicity, names 
of pets, age, employment categories—is redacted at source, it is 
hardly surprising that the quasi- obligation to engage in a wholly 
anonymised exchange does not often provide the resolution that 
is sought, but becomes a focal point of overt disturbance for 
givers and receivers alike.
In the context of anonymity, the gift rhetoric that is the 
common currency of any communication unintentionally flirts 
with danger by encouraging donor proxies to look for a return on 
their supposed altruism when nothing substantial can be offered. 
At an unproblematised level, the implicit demand for reciprocity 
can collapse into ‘the tyranny of the gift’ for both parties.11 More-
over, the exchange model of the gift, originally associated with the 
anthropological work of Mauss (1990),12 suggests that any dona-
tion exceeds its mere materiality to figure something intrinsic to 
the giver. As Mauss writes, ‘one gives away what is in reality a part 
of one’s nature and substance’ (1990, 10), and that ‘the objects 
are never completely separated from the men who exchange 
them’ (1990, 31). In line with the instinctive feelings of proxies, 
this suggests that something of the donor does indeed live on in 
another, as is sometimes explicitly acknowledged by recipients 
themselves. More often, however, the uncanny persistence of 
the other manifests as a disconcerting awareness that one’s own 
embodied being is now hybrid. The same impressions are strongly 
reflected in the popular imagination, where representations of 
transplantation abound with uneasy narratives that express an 
underlying fear that the personal characteristics of the deceased 
donor might take possession of the recipient, or that s/he might 
reappear as a spectral presence. It is not just—as phenomenology 
might predict—a change that could be assimilated in the fash-
ioning of a new embodied self, but of a self that is haunted by 
irregular traces of otherness. For Derrida (1994), the coming of the 
other is inevitable and it always constitutes a hauntological rela-
tionship between absence and presence, life and death, as well as 
self and other, the very issues that frame the existential register of 
heart transplantation.13 Although the model proposed by Mauss 
might appear at odds with the very different understanding of the 
gift relation offered by Derrida (1992), which does not rely on 
exchange and where identity should not be known, there is in both 
a hauntological dimension that finds resonance in the concept of 
‘living on’ that is the counterpart of deceased donation.
All forms of organ and tissue donation might be expected to 
evoke the absent presence of the other, but throughout our inter-
view material, which often touches on other forms of donation, 
it is invariably the heart, with all its cultural baggage, that is the 
centre of attention. All the respondents spoke of donors who 
were the source of multiple organ and tissue transplants, but no 
other organ had the power to disturb the normative teleology 
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of life and death, that was attributed to the heart. One bereaved 
mother (D16) expressed something of this breakdown: “I miss 
him, I miss him, I carry him in my heart for ever. You carry 
him for 9 months, to grow up, to have a normal progression,” 
and unusually she saw the trope of ‘living on’ as extending to 
herself. Imagining what she would tell the recipient, she says, 
“Take care of the heart and it will look after you for the rest of 
your life,” adding “I hope he’d look after his heart. After all I 
created that heart…(I hope) he’s a good man.” In that context, it 
is no surprise that the death of a recipient—if it is known—can 
come as another personally felt death. As one mother told us, 
“We need to know that they lived.” A single respondent (D12) 
cited the spare parts model of transplantation—“it’s like taking 
an engine out of a car”—and a couple more referred to the heart 
as a pump, but for the majority there is nothing impersonal 
about the transfer. Against the clinical metaphor of replaceable 
machine parts, the counternarratives of the gift of life and donor 
altruism promoted by OPOs are the ones that make most intui-
tive sense to donor families. Where for the clinical professionals 
the success or failure of the procedure is a matter of objective 
biomedical measures, the longer term emotional impact of the 
decision on the lives of donor families and recipients alike tells 
another story in which the clear distinction between life and 
death is lost.
With regard to living on, however, the approved notion is 
supposed to be purely symbolic, or at least referencing only the 
recovering recipient. The authorised discourses stop short at a 
template of a dying, and then deceased, donor superseded by 
the putatively restored life proper to the recipient alone. Despite 
the keen beliefs of donor proxies, indicated in the quotes above, 
there is nothing in official models to disturb the succession of 
singular selves. In the biomedical imaginary—which constrains 
but does not wholly suppress the intimations of donor families—
if only inanimate material is transferred then no ontological 
anxieties should arise. At present, the imposition of anonymity 
matters both positively and, more often, negatively precisely 
because transplantation is seen as an exchange that grounds 
an intimate and ongoing relation between self and other. Yet, 
as Davies (2006, 8) notes in her research on kidney donation, 
‘attempts by either donor or recipient to construct a social rela-
tionship is viewed by professionals as pathological, something 
to be treated through counselling’ (2006, 260). What is really 
needed is a radical shake- up of a realm where personal identi-
ties are the privileged markers of living, and dying, that instead 
moves towards a biopolitics of transplantation that emerges from 
postmodernist insights into multiplicity, fluidity and vitalism. 
The theoretical models that I favour require a wholesale turning 
away from the central tenets of the Western imaginary, not least 
concerning the integrity of bodies, the sovereignty of the self, the 
meaning of death and the justice of exchange. Above all, if there 
is always something about death that is uncanny, that exceeds 
rationalist thought, then we need to queer the concept and ask 
whether there are more perceptive ways of thinking the process 
of dying.
Before pursuing that different theoretical—and in the end more 
affective approach—I want to quickly mark that the biology of 
transplantation is far less straightforward than it purports to be. 
I have already outlined the difficulty of making a biomedically 
coherent cut between life and death once a donor body is main-
tained in a perfused state and the ontological anxiety that invokes 
in donor proxies, but there is an even more complicating factor. 
The phenomenon of microchimerism in which a single body 
may host two or more entirely separate sets of DNA has long 
been acknowledged as a feature of maternal- fetal interchange 
in pregnancy and subsequently, and more controversially, since 
the early 1990s as a potential outcome of transplantation (Starzl 
et al. 1992; Quaini et al. 2002). When a heart or indeed any 
other organ or tissue is grafted into a recipient, it carries with 
it the DNA coding and the unique immune system markers 
(human leucocyte antigen, HLA) of the donor.14 Unlike other 
forms of hybridity where merging within each cell may occur, 
the distinctive cell line of the donor is not assimilated but persists 
in parallel to that of the recipient. Until a couple of decades ago, 
it was believed—if the phenomenon was considered at all—that 
the non- self coding would remain in situ at the location of the 
transplant, or that if any circulation occurred it would be of just 
a few weeks duration until the self cells re- established themselves 
throughout the body. Research now indicates that non- self cells 
circulate widely and are transported not only in the blood but 
can migrate and accumulate in organs and tissues other than the 
one transplanted. Moreover, it has been repeatedly shown that 
non- self cells persist for decades.15 An autopsy of a female heart 
recipient with a male donor, for example, could reveal male 
(Y- marked cells) in the brain or liver.
At this point in time, the existence and persistence of micro-
chimerism are no longer doubted, but its cause—transplan-
tation is just one of several possible sources—and its effect 
remain highly disputed in the bioscience of immunology. The 
major controversy revolves around the question of whether it 
should be regarded as pathological or beneficial, or perhaps 
both in different contexts. Biomedicine aside, the implica-
tions of microchimerism have become an arena of deep fasci-
nation for biophilosophy, particularly with reference to the 
notion of immunity, but also for the instability it brings to 
questions of self and other and life and death (Pradeu 2012; 
Staikou 2014; Shildrick 2019). If microchimerism is an almost 
certain outcome of transplantation, then it would appear 
that the intuitive feelings that constitute what I am calling a 
hauntology have a surprising biological endorsement. Once 
a donor’s DNA and HLA are embodied by the recipient but 
remain unassimilated, then self- identity is no longer certain 
and the trope of living on in another begins to make mate-
rial sense. Microchimerism is as yet a little known aspect of 
transplantation—medicine like other epistemological systems 
tends to work in silos where cardiologists may be unaware of 
the work of immunologists, for example—and it is unlikely 
that the overwhelming majority of lay people involved have 
any knowledge of its operation. But just as the public under-
standing of science has very swiftly encompassed the existence 
of the human microbiome, although its ontological implica-
tions have yet to be grasped, so too microchimerism seems 
poised to give weight to feelings that have hitherto appeared 
to be merely speculative and even somewhat discreditable. It 
is not that bioscience is the final arbiter of the truth of the 
body, or even that there is any fixed point of truth, but that the 
question of intracorporeality that microchimerism introduces 
may give credence to the sense of a hauntological relationship 
between the recipient and donor in transplantation.
As a philosopher concerned with experiential states, I have 
long felt highly ambivalent about organ transplantation, 
initially from witnessing the ongoing disruption of recipients 
(which I have scarcely touched on here16), but more recently in 
response to proxy donors and their distress around the ambi-
guities of life and death. Fear of death is ubiquitous both for 
its putative termination of the singular self, and paradoxically 
because the dead have haunted the imaginaries of every age and 
culture. The first consideration is easy to understand and hard 
to shake, but with respect to transplantation the second—on 
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both sides of the transfer—has the capacity to evoke the nega-
tive spectre of parasitism where one lives on at the expense of 
the other, but also the creativity of assemblage—the coming 
together of disparate elements—and sustainability. I want to 
end, then, by picking up a final quote from the interview with 
a female professor (D21). Despite her cool rationalism, she 
said something of her husband’s death that can move us on, 
“It’s no longer life, it’s potential,” and perhaps she was intu-
itively echoing the insight of Deleuze (1990), for whom the 
ontology of death cannot be limited to its manifestation in 
the sovereign subject, but is ‘incorporeal and infinitive, imper-
sonal’ (1990, 151), beyond the concerns of any individual. In 
parallel, human life itself is not a finite essence, actualised in 
the limited lifespan of an individual, but rather a form that 
is temporally and spatially expansive, a component of the 
enveloping cycle of becoming that comprises all types of living 
beings, organisms, as well, in Deleuzian terms, as machines. 
Although each individually identified human life is marked 
by discrete episodes such as pregnancy, transplantation or 
dying that effect radical changes or transformations for that 
specific person, in another sense, those modes also transcend 
any singular form of embodiment and can be understood as 
intangible and atemporal forces and points of intensity. The 
Deleuzian approach rejects the modernist and very Western 
imaginary of an atomistic and sovereign subject, and celebrates 
instead not sustained and independent ‘being’—the enduring 
sense of self—but a material and processual state of becoming 
in which any individuality is provisional and always in the 
course of unravelling (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). In short, 
the boundaries of the selfsame are superseded by the macro- 
context of collective becoming.
As Deleuze sets out, each of us is entangled in what he calls 
assemblages, those fields of energy reliant on multiple and 
shifting networks of interconnections, both organic and inor-
ganic, that constitute life itself. In such heterogeneous orders, 
what matters are the mutual interactions and the irreducible 
hybridity of form that exceeds the unique experiences and 
singular embodiment of the individual (Shildrick 2015b). In 
place of existing epistemologies predefining and limiting the 
possible connections open to the singular self, in an assem-
blage, the dynamic is reversed with the interconnections them-
selves generating meaning. That dynamic better enables us to 
understand what is at stake in chimerism, where disparate cell 
lines continue to circulate in conjunction, mutually affective 
and functioning through a new mode of configuration rather 
than being assimilated as such. Where the metaphor of para-
sitism may at first appear to have some purchase in the mode 
of living on after organ transplantation,17 its evocation of self/
other antagonism has little in common with the Deleuzian 
model of assemblage. That postbinary approach insists that 
human life is always inherently entangled not only with other 
living beings but with a plethora of more or less animate tech-
nologies and processes. In blurring the boundaries of other-
ness, entanglement conjures up neither parasitism nor the 
absence/presence of Derridean hauntology where an ethical 
relation must exist. Assemblage theory establishes the produc-
tive capacity of connectivity and its incessant transformation, 
and may offer a template for rethinking organ transplantation, 
not as a one- off event, but as an ongoing and fluid project that 
encompasses both the recipient and the deceased donor.
The medical humanities to date have a limited apprecia-
tion of the Deleuzian intervention into modernist ontology 
and epistemology, but assemblages are highly significant in 
enabling us to reconsider the nature of embodiment, not least 
in transplantation (Shildrick 2015a). Deleuze reminds us, 
moreover, that what is at issue is not functional efficacy, or 
the expectation that a singular life will prevail. In the liberal 
humanist context in which only individual selfhood counts, it 
is understandable that donor families wish to see the donor 
living on in another, and that recipients should experience 
disturbance when they feel themselves no longer the self who 
preceded the surgery. In the Deleuzian mode, however, life 
is not the possession of an individual but an intense process 
of becoming other that does not meet a limit in death. In 
that sense, the deceased donor—whose varying organs and 
tissues will typically be distributed among multiple recipi-
ents—continues to contribute to the ongoing flux and flow 
of life. Living on impacts many bodies who are thus brought 
into relation with one another. With regard to the survival of 
the transplant recipients, what matters in Deleuzian terms is 
neither guilt about the donor’s death nor any obligation to 
bear witness to them, but the capacity to affirm life, both in 
its renewed potential and in its endurance. The good life is 
one that overflows individual boundaries and transforms itself 
even in the face of adversity, moving always towards new possi-
bilities of becoming other than itself. In an important sense, 
the death of the donor is negated, but not by the transfer of 
personal characteristics to another. It is an impersonal relation 
in which both the giver and the receiver live on in a new and 
sometimes volatile assemblage.
At the present time, the sociocultural imaginary of the global 
North remains dominated by quasi- Cartesian conceptions of 
the body, and by the separation of self and other, both modes 
that facilitate the surgical onslaught of heart transplantation 
through the machine model and at the same time generate deep 
anxieties when that model fails to correspond with lived expe-
rience. The research I have outlined attempts to think beyond 
transplantation as a heroic intervention that defies death, and 
to recognise that organ donation generates a disturbing and 
potentially painful awareness that the boundaries of the self 
are no longer certain. It suggests two new registers of thought: 
first, if the personal event of dying were seen simultaneously as 
the recomposition of life under new relations of sustainability, 
then mortality itself would not be a failure; and second we 
might reimagine existence not in terms of a recovered self, but 
through dynamic incorporeal coexistence and forms of assem-
blage. In contradistinction to modernist societies that regulate 
what is deemed appropriate to any given body, the Deleuzian 
approach advocates pushing to the limits of what is possible, 
embracing uncertainty and radical change, and sustaining 
becoming, however that plays out. The task is surely to begin 
to change the sociocultural imaginary. One step might be to 
push the authoritative discourse of biomedicine to give up 
its investment in mastery and chrononormativity and openly 
explore what lies beyond the wound of the sutured body. It 
requires a paradigm shift on the part not just of clinicians, but 
all of us, to bring the threads together. Revisiting the case of 
the First Nations family, it is apparent that beyond the Western 
mindset there are already more positive ways of thinking death 
that can speak to a wider atemporal vitalism. We cannot deny 
the immediate pain or grief of individual demise, but it can be 
mitigated through an open encounter with another dimension 
where living and dying, self and other, absence and presence 
are irreducibly entangled.
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NOTES
1. The original team consisted of Heather Ross (cardiologist), Pat McKeever and Jen Poole 
(health sociologists), Susan Abbey (psychiatrist), Margrit Shildrick (philosopher), Enza 
DeLuca and Oliver Mauthner (nurse- trained interviewers), and Alexa Wright, Andrew 
Carnie, Ingrid Bachmann and Catherine Richards (artists). Full ethical approval under 
REB #07-0822- BE.
2. See Campos et al. (2018). Research is focused on animal studies, but the implications 
for human physiology cannot be overlooked.
3. In recent years, donation after circulatory death (DCD) has been reinstated as an 
acceptable procedure. Donors may be those who do not fulfil brain death criteria 
but have no hope of recovery and for whom the withdrawal of life support is in their 
supposed best interests (Manara, Murphy, and O’Callaghan 2012). In 2016, the 
British Transplantation Society recommended against DCD for heart transplants, but 
restricted—and mostly paediatric—procedures are underway in many jurisdictions, 
including the UK, USA and Canada.
4. For Agamben (1998), the brain- dead body is a paradigm case of bare life and therefore 
open to sacrifice, but for those at the bedside, hopes of recovery—or perhaps just 
endurance—sustain the sense, not of death, but of the extreme vulnerability of a still 
embodied self.
5. See Lock (2002) for an analysis of the criteria and meaning of death in contrasting 
North American and Japanese contexts.
6. All names have been changed.
7. Indigeneity is a somewhat uncomfortable blanket term naming a typically Western 
form of categorisation. In Canada, indigenous peoples may identify with the very 
different cultures of Métis, Inuit or First Nations, none of which should be seen as 
uniform in themselves. To speak of an indigenous imaginary implies only alternative 
ways of thinking unfamiliar to more common Canadian mores.
8. There are relatively few studies of organ transplantation within indigenous 
populations, although the work of Webb and Shaw (2011) with Maori communities is 
an exception.
9. The claim to kinship between donor families and heart recipients, for example, may be 
deeply unwelcome (Dicks et al. 2018).
10. Fox and Swazey (1992) were among the first to offer a critique of the ’spare parts’ 
model from the perspective of the humanities.
11. The term was first coined by Fox and Swazey (1992) in relation to a range of organ 
transplantation procedures.
12. The exchange itself is theoretically endless in the Maussian model, with each party 
consecutively occupying the position of the giver or the receiver. In the context of 
heart transplantation, the initial sending of a letter—even under the strictures of 
anonymity—implicitly demands a reply, which in turn necessitates its own reply and 
so on.
13. Derrida (1994) Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the 
New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge.
14. An individual’s immune system is characterised by human leucocyte antigens (HLA) 
expressed by a group of genes on a single chromosome. There is rarely a complete 
match of HLA between two individuals, except in the case of monozygotic twins. Given 
that heart transplantation relies on deceased donation, there is effectively never a 
match.
15. I have already written extensively about the research behind these claims. See Shildrick 
(2016), Shildrick (2017), 2020.
16. See Ross et al. (2010) for an analysis of the early data from the Process of 
Incorporating a Transplanted Heart project.
17. Nancy (2002) text L’Intrus, written after his own heart transplant, initially suggests a 
form of parasitism, although it moves to a more Derridean conclusion: ’The intrus is no 
other than me, my self’ (13).
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